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ABSTRACT
Governments may exclude vendors from procurement awards for many reasons, 
including poor performance and corruption. Excluding a vendor, whether from 
a particular procurement (deciding that the vendor is not qualified for award) or 
from an entire procurement system (suspending or debarring the vendor), calls 
for a complex assessment of the performance and reputational risks posed by 
that vendor, and of the costs of exclusion. As the EU’s Member States shape their 
exclusion systems consistent with the EU’s procurement directives, the Member 
States may wish to draw on U.S. strategies for managing risks in contractor qual-
ification: requiring that contractors establish strong internal controls, centralizing 
the management of vendor exclusions, and using administrative agreements and 
independent monitors which allow agencies to mitigate risks even as they, and 
their vendors, avoid the disruption that suspension and debarment may cause. 
These U.S. strategies align well with the EU procurement directives, and in many 
cases reflect a natural extension of strategies that EU Member States are already 
using to address the risks posed by bad or corrupt contractors. 
All over the world, public procurement systems seek to maximize efficiency 
in public spending. To frame a goal for efficient procurement, the legal regimes 
governing public procurement sometimes use the terms best value or value for 
money, and there are a number of legal constructs used to further that ambitious 
goal. These constructs include, among others, regulations on competition, trans-
parency and integrity, on different solicitation methods, on evaluation criteria 
for award, on e-procurement mechanisms and contract administration, and on 
complaints or protests about the procurement process. Most importantly for our 
purposes here, those constructs generally include qualification requirements for 
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vendors – qualification which may be denied when a contractor is excluded from 
a particular contract (typically by an individual contracting official), and broader 
exclusion (which we will treat here as suspension or debarment) which can bar a 
vendor from participating at all in a procurement system. Contractors may be 
excluded for any number of reasons, including of course rank corruption.1
This question of qualification and exclusion – of selecting vendors that are 
responsible and appropriately prepared to perform, and excluding those that are 
not – can be addressed through qualification criteria and, more broadly, through 
exclusion criteria which often build on those same qualification criteria. While 
the EU’s main procurement directive, Directive 2014/24/EU,2 seems to divide 
these two questions of qualification and exclusion, the U.S. government bundles 
the two into one concept: an assessment of the responsibility of the vendor. If a 
vendor is not responsible, it is not qualified and cannot be awarded a contract; 
by the same token, once a vendor is confronted with proof of its prior miscon-
duct, if the vendor cannot show that it is “presently responsible” it generally will 
be excluded from federal procurement.3 The term present responsibility refers to 
business ethics, integrity, honesty and competence.4 The modifier present plays a 
pivotal role in the U.S. federal exclusion regime, because a vendor may show that 
notwithstanding past troubling conduct, at present that risk has been mitigated 
or eliminated, and that therefore exclusion is unnecessary.5 
Various sources of information are used by U.S. government agencies to assess 
contractors’ qualifications – including direct inquiries, market surveys, past per-
formance data, and certifications submitted to the government6 -- to ensure that 
federal agencies deal only with responsible vendors that are prepared to fulfill their 
legal and contractual obligations7. Those firms that do not meet high standards of 
responsibility under the primary principles of the U.S. public procurement system 
1 See generally Sope Williams-Elegbe, Fighting Corruption in Public Procurement: A Comparative Anal-
ysis of Disqualification or Debarment Measures (Bloomsbury 2012).
2 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 94 (March 
28, 2014), p. 65–242 (hereinafter “Directive 2014/24/EU”).
3 For a discussion of the history of this concept of “responsibility,” see, e.g., Robert F. Meunier & 
Trevor B. A. Nelson, Is It Time for A Single Federal Suspension and Debarment Rule?, 46 Pub. Cont. 
L.J. 553, 556 (2017).
4 FAR 9.103 (b); see also Christopher Yukins, Cristiana Silva & Mariana Avelar, A Comparative View 
of Debarment and Suspension of Contractors in Brazil and in the USA (2017), 66 Admin. & Constit. 
L. Rev. 61 (2016), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080396. 
5 See Robert T. Rhoad & David Robbins, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension, in Thomson Reuters’ 
Government Contracts Year in Review Conference – covering 2018, Conference Briefs 2019, pp. 
15-24.
6 See, e.g., FAR 9.105-1(c).
7 See Kate M. Manuel, Congressional Research Service, Debarment and Suspension of Government 
Contractors: An Overview of the Law Including Recently Enacted and Proposed Amendments (Nov. 19, 
2008), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34753.pdf.
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are excluded from winning federal contracts, consistent with Steven Schooner’s 
observation that bribery, favoritism and unethical behavior have no place in a 
successful procurement system.8 
The question, then, is whether the U.S. government’s approach to contractor 
qualification and exclusion can be integrated successfully into an international 
public procurement market. There is political support for closer trade relations 
between the United States and the EU, and those closer relations presumably 
would include more tightly integrated procurement markets, both between 
the United States and the EU and globally.9 With this in mind, both business 
exchanges and regulatory cooperation require a sound understanding of the main 
legal and economic constructs on both sides of the Atlantic. More specifically, 
issues of qualification and exclusion probably will prove central to successful 
integration of procurement markets, as qualification and exclusion (if handled 
incorrectly) can raise serious barriers to cross-border procurement. Rather than 
integrating and converging, however, qualification and exclusion have diverged 
in troubling ways in the U.S. and EU regimes. 
In this paper, the starting point for our comparative analysis will be the U.S. 
government’s Federal Acquisition Regulation,10 most importantly its provisions 
regarding exclusion and debarment11. Our main argument builds on a ground-
breaking assessment of debarment internationally by Sope Williams-Elegbe,12 
8 See generally Steven Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 
(2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Review 103.
9 See, e.g., Christopher Yukins & Hans-Joachim Prieß, Breaking the Impasse in the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Negotiations: Rethinking Priorities in Procurement, 56 Gov. Contr. 
1, 3-7 (July 23, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2471653. 
There have been serious attempts to foster transatlantic cooperation in the last few years. One result 
was the intensive work done on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) from 
2010 to 2016. Even though TTIP has been largely suspended during the Trump administration, the 
gradual globalization of public procurement markets means that there is an ongoing, and serious, 
need for better integration of the two public procurement regimes. For a discussion of the current 
levels of cross-border procurement trade between the EU and the United States, see Christopher 
R. Yukins, International Procurement Developments in 2018 – Part IV: The United States in Interna-
tional Procurement: Understanding a Pause in the Trump Administration’s Protectionism, 2019 Gov’t 
Contracts Year in Rev. Br. 6 (available on Westlaw). 
10 https://www.acquisition.gov/browse/index/far. For a thorough introduction to the U.S. suspension 
and debarment regime, see, e.g., John Pachter, Christopher Yukins & Jessica Tillipman, U.S. Debar-
ment: An Introduction (Feb. 24, 2019) (draft chapter for forthcoming volume, Cambridge U. Press 
(D. Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij, eds.)), available at http://publicprocurementinternational.
com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-02-24-Draft-Debarment-Compliance-Handbook-Chapter-
John-Pachter-Chris-Yukins-Jessica-Tillipman-1.pdf. 
11 This paper will not make a close review of exclusion and debarment in “nonprocurement” matters 
(such as grants by the federal government), or in state and local governments in the US, which have 
independent procurement systems. 
12 Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 3.
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a pivotal comparative paper by Sati Harutyunyan,13 and a series of papers and 
presentations given at a March 2019 symposium at King’s College, London,14 that 
policy makers in the EU may wish to look to some of the solutions for exclusion 
and debarment that have developed over many years in the U.S. federal procure-
ment system. Drawing on lessons from the U.S. experience may ease cooperation 
in cross-border trade, and may help the EU Member States advance their own 
systems for exclusion and debarment, which are being developed under the broad 
mandates of the EU’s 2014 procurement directives.15 
Sharing lessons across the Atlantic may be easier than it seems, because the 
two systems – U.S. and EU – in fact have a great deal in common. Both systems 
focus first on effective public spending in procurement (the “value for money” 
norm discussed above).16 In both systems, common principles such as competition, 
integrity and transparency play key roles. 
There are also, though, several basic differences between the two systems. 
Unlike the U.S. federal system, which relies heavily on multilateral competitive 
negotiations for more complex procurements, Member States in the EU tend 
to rely much more heavily on open procedures (most analogous to price-based 
13 While this paper argues that elements of the U.S. suspension and debarment model could be accom-
modated within the structure set by the EU procurement directives, Sati Harutyunyan went a step 
further and argued that the directive itself should be reformed to call for debarment systems in the 
EU Member States. See Sati Harutyunyan, Risk and Expectation in Exclusion from Public Procure-
ment: Understanding Market Access and Harmonization Between the European Union and the United 
States, 45 Pub. Cont. L.J. 449, 476 (2016) (“A debarment structure stipulated in the Directive 
. . . may provide a solution to the sufficiency assessment in the EU system because it would allow 
Member States to identify the party responsible for that decision. Identifying a party responsible 
for assessing whether self-cleaning is sufficient would add transparency to the EU exclusion system 
and provide contractors with more guidance of government expectations.”).
14 http://publicprocurementinternational.com/2019/01/14/kings-college-london-gwu-law-school-annu-
al-symposium-exclusion-and-debarment-18-march-2019/. 
15 For an extended history of qualification and exclusion under the EU procurement regime, see Sope 
Williams-Elegbe, supra note 3, at 38-47.
16 One of the central goals of U.S. acquisition reform in the 1990s was efficiency. See, e.g., Steven 
Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, (2002) 11 Public Procure-
ment Law Review 103. For recommendations on implementing efficiency, see Christopher Yukins 
& Steven Schooner, Public Procurement: Focus on People, Value for Money and Systemic Integrity, 
Not Protectionism (Mar. 9, 2009), in The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: 
Recommendations for the G20, Chapter 17 (Richard Baldwin & Simon Evenett, eds., A VoxEU.
org Publication), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1356170. At the same time, the trajectory of 
reform in the EU the approach has been shaped much more by the promotion of core Single Market 
principles – competence, transparency and equal treatment, and the achievement of efficiency sup-
ported by these basic principles. See, e.g., Sope Williams-Elegbe, supra note 3, at 38-47 (discussing 
EU approach to qualification and exclusion).
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“sealed bids” in the United States).17 The U.S. federal system includes a number 
of mature and aggressive socioeconomic initiatives; procurement under the EU 
procurement directives, in contrast, is only now beginning to embrace socio-
economic goals, often under the rubric of “sustainability” in public procurement.18 
And while the EU’s Member States make extensive use of the competition excep-
tion for “in-house” procurement (procurement by one public agency through 
another, subsidiary agency),19 this issue of “in-sourced” procurement between 
agencies has played a far smaller role in U.S. federal procurement.20 These types 
of differences do not, however, preclude useful comparison between the U.S. 
and EU approaches to exclusion and debarment; indeed, as the discussion below 
shows, these differences in other quarters point up structural parallels in the 
two systems and thus make it easier to see how the two systems can cooperate 
in exclusion and debarment.
The analysis below proceeds in several parts. Part 1 reviews the roles of exclu-
sion and debarment in any procurement system. Part 2 discusses why and how 
exclusion and debarment occur in the U.S. federal procurement system and the 
path forward for exclusion and debarment under the 2014 EU procurement 
directives. In Part 3, important aspects of the U.S. system will be examined 
and compared to the EU regime: a requirement for internal contractor controls 
(known as “corporate compliance” in the United States), the role of a suspension 
and debarment official in the U.S. federal system, and how U.S. officials may 
resolve concerns regarding a contractor’s qualifications through administrative 
agreements, sometimes supported by an independent monitor. As the conclusion 
in Part 4 notes, many of these aspects of the U.S. system are echoed in the emerg-
ing EU regime, and the U.S. experience could be useful in improving exclusion 
and debarment in the EU (and elsewhere), and in facilitating cross-border pro-
curement in the years to come.
17 Compare Christopher R. Yukins, The U.S. Federal Procurement System: An Introduction, Upphand-
lingsrättslig Tidskrift 2017 p. 69, p. 81-83 (citing study of Umer Chaudhry showing that multi-
lateral competitive negotiations are used in roughly 60 per cent of federal procurements), available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063559, with European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Measurement of 
Impact of Cross-Border Penetration in Public Procurement (2017) (competitive dialogue (analogous 
to U.S. competitive negotiations) used in approximately 5000 procurements versus open tendering 
(analogous to U.S. sealed bidding) used in approximately 2.5 million procurements, i.e., in roughly 
2 per cent of EU procurements).
18 See, e.g., Max V. Kidalov, Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative 
Assessment, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 443 (2011).
19 See, e.g., European Commission, Public Procurement Reform Provides Explicit Rules on Public-Public 
Cooperation (Mar. 21, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/public-procurement-reform-pro-
vides-explicit-rules-public-public-cooperation-0_en.
20 See, e.g., Wojciech Hartung & Katarzyna Kuzma, In-House Procurement -- How It Is Implemented 
and Applied in Poland, 13 EPPPL 171 (2018).
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1 Exclusion and Debarment in Public Procurement: 
Roles and Aims
At the heart of any public procurement system is the government’s obligation to 
spend public funds prudently. Public procurement, if done imprudently, presents 
at least kinds of risks: reputation risk (the risk that the government’s reputation 
will suffer if, for example, it contracts with a disreputable vendor), performance 
risk (the risk that an unqualified vendor will not perform), and fiduciary risk (the 
risk that funds entrusted to a public agency will not be spent as intended).21 While 
those in the private sector typically focus on performance risk, governments also 
develop complex rules systems to mitigate reputational risks. Thus, for example, 
while a private consumer will focus on whether a vendor will perform a contract 
when assessing that vendor’s qualification, a public customer also will consider the 
reputational risks that the vendor poses to the government. As a threshold matter, 
therefore, two risks – performance and reputational – play vitally important roles 
in how a government qualifies, or excludes, a prospective contractor.
Exclusion and debarment of vendors that pose special performance or repu-
tational risks are thus the threshold means of protecting the public’s interest. In 
the U.S. federal system, qualification and debarment promote this aim by pre-
cluding agencies from entering into new contracts with vendors, for example, that 
have previously violated the law, or have failed to perform on prior contracts. In 
the U.S. perspective, those prior failures suggest that the vendor lacks adequate 
internal controls, and thus is nonresponsible (to use the U.S. term of art).22 At the 
same time, both the data that public officials draw upon in making qualification 
decisions and exclusion itself may serve as early warnings for other procurement 
systems that seek to avoid these same vendors.23 As a result, exclusion and debar-
ment for unqualified vendors serve to protect the public interest, not only in the 
procuring state but also more broadly among governments and institutions that 
share information regarding contractor qualification. 
Given these goals, the issues that arise around exclusion and debarment in public 
procurement tend to fall into several common categories. The first involves the ques-
tion why vendors may be excluded or debarred. As the discussion below reflects, the 
EU procurement directives and the U.S. federal procurement rules take different 
approaches to this threshold question, in part because the EU, vitally concerned 
with ensuring that vendors are not excluded as a result of national bias in the 
21 See, e.g., Jesper Stenberg Johnsøn, The Basics of Corruption Risk Management (2015), available 
at https://www.u4.no/publications/the-basics-of-corruption-risk-management-a-framework-
for-decision-making-and- integration-into-the-project-cycles.pdf. 
22 See Kate M. Manuel, supra note 9, at 8. 
23 See Johannes S. Schnitzer & Christopher Yukins, Combating Corruption in Procurement: Debarment 
Present and Future, in Future-Proofing Procurement 26-27 (UNOPS 2016), available at http://www.
bhrinlaw.org/documents/2015-asr-supplement.pdf.
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Member States, fosters slightly differing approaches to vendor qualification. Second, 
there is the question of who should disqualify – should it be the contracting official in 
charge of a specific procurement, or should a higher-level official (or agency) make 
more general decisions to exclude vendors across an entire procurement system? 
Third is the question of rehabilitation and controls – of the circumstances under 
which a wayward vendor will be allowed to reenter a public procurement market. 
As the discussion below reflects, while both the EU and the U.S. government may 
allow a vendor to return to public markets if the vendor institutes internal controls 
(“self-cleans,” in the EU term), the U.S. government tends to approach exclusion 
not as a matter of rectifying (or “cleaning”) specific failures, but rather as part of 
a broader effort to manage the risks posed by unqualified contractors.
2 Exclusion and Debarment Under the U.S. Federal 
Acquisition Regulation 
2.1 General Remarks
The U.S. federal procurement market is one of the largest in the world. According 
to USASpending.gov, the U.S. government’s leading website on federal procure-
ment data, the federal government spends roughly US$500 billion on contracts 
every year – slightly less, for example, than the annual gross domestic products of 
Sweden or Poland.24 Because the U.S. government’s procurement market is highly 
attractive to vendors from all over the world, this market is competitive, but also 
very demanding. It requires not only that contractors provide very high-quality 
goods and services, but also that they adhere to high ethical standards. These 
robust expectations for contractors are reflected in many ways, including the large 
numbers of contractors and individuals suspended and debarred each year. The 
coordinating committee for federal suspension and debarment officials from across 
the federal agencies, the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee 
(ISDC), reported that in 2017 a total of 604 contractors and individuals were 
suspended (exclusion on a temporary basis, for example while an investigation 
proceeds), 1613 were proposed for debarment (a process which, under U.S. rules, 
normally triggers de facto debarment), and 1423 were proposed for debarment or 
debarred (exclusion across all federal agencies, generally for a term of years), for a 
24 https://datalab.usaspending.gov/contracts-over-time.html. 
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total of 3640 actions.25 The suspending and debarring officials in the Department 
of Defense were the leaders, probably because defense procurement represents by 
far the largest portion of U.S. federal procurement. As noted, these suspension 
and debarment decisions, though issued by a lone suspension and debarment 
official in a specific agency, apply across the federal government; thus, if an 
agency suspension and debarment official determines that a contractor is not 
presently responsible, that decision will have government-wide effect, and may 
have collateral effects if other governments, or institutions, rely on that decision.
Although the concept of contractor responsibility can be traced to the earli-
est days of the republic during the Revolutionary War,26 one of the first formal 
recognitions of debarment came in 1928 when the U.S. Comptroller General 
recognized that in some instances “the interests of the United States” may neces-
sitate debarment27. With the passage of the Buy American Act of 1933, Con-
gress expressly authorized debarment based on a statutory violation for those 
contractors that sold goods in violation of the Act.28 Two laws from the 1940s, 
the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 and the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949, laid the groundwork for what in the early 
1980s became the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which governs procurement 
across all the agencies of the executive branch of the U.S. government. In 1982, 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued Policy Letter 82-1, which estab-
lished temporary uniform guidelines for suspension and debarment.29 Two years 
later, the FAR and its provisions regarding exclusion, debarment and suspen-
sion became effective.30 Since that time, many rulings clarifying the scope and 
meaning of the FAR guidance on exclusion and debarment have been issued. 
25 See The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee Report FY 2017, at 2 (2018), available at 
https://www.acquisition.gov/isdc-reporting. The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Commit-
tee reports to Congress annually on the status of the federal suspension and debarment system, 
pursuant to Section 873 of Public Law No. 110-417. Per Section 873, the reports describe the 
government’s progress in improving suspension and debarment, and provide a summary of each 
agency’s suspension and debarment activities for the fiscal year. Id.
26 See, e.g., Capt. Shawn T. Gallagher, Due Process Standards and Considerations Regarding Suspension 
and Debarment, at 2-3 (Judge Advocate General’s School,1988) (discussing history), available at 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a451526.pdf.
27 For more general histories of the U.S. federal procurement system, see, e.g., James Nagle, A History 
of Government Contracting (2d ed. 2012); Christopher R. Yukins, supra note 19.
28 Buy American Act of 1933, Public Law No. 428, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 212, title III, sec. 3(b), 
47 Stat. 1489, 1520 (March 3, 1933), available at http://legisworks.org/congress/72/publaw-428.pdf. 
29 The temporary debarment guidance, which was to expire in 1984 (the year the FAR took effect), 
was reproduced at 41 Code of Federal Regulations, Appendix (1982).
30 See Joseph D. West, Timothy J. Hatch, Christyne K. Brennan & Lawrence J.C. VanDyke, Suspen-
sion and Debarment, 06-9 Briefing Papers 1, 2 (Thomson West, Aug. 2006), available at https://
www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/WestHatch-SuspensionDebar-
mentBriefingPaper.pdf. 
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The current U.S. provisions concerning exclusion and debarment are gathered 
in Part 9, Contractor Qualification, of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, at 
Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.31 Subpart 9.1 addresses contractor 
responsibility – what it takes for a contractor to be qualified for award of a federal 
contract, and how that question of contractor responsibility is to be determined 
by the contracting officer – and Subpart 9.4 addresses suspension and debarment, 
i.e., how those not “presently responsible” will be barred from U.S. procurement.32 
Debarment in the U.S. federal system33 is generally understood as “an action 
taken by a debarring official . . . to exclude a contractor” from U.S. government 
contracting “for a reasonable, specified period,” typically for a period of years34; 
suspension means “action taken by a suspending official . . . to disqualify a con-
tractor temporarily” from government contracting and government-approved 
subcontracting. The standards for contractor qualification (responsibility) are 
similar to, but not identical with, the standards for suspension and debarment. 
The differences are not surprising, for responsibility standards define which ven-
dors can be awarded a contract, and suspension and debarment standards define 
which cannot. That said, both sets of standards – responsibility and suspension/
debarment – can be read of a piece, as related guides for officials in assessing the 
performance and reputational risks posed by prospective contractors. Indeed, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation itself knits together the concepts of responsibility 
and suspension/debarment in FAR 9.402(a), where it notes as a matter of policy 
that agencies are to award contracts only to responsible contractors, and that 
debarment and suspension, as “discretionary actions . . . are appropriate means 
to effectuate this policy”.
Both sets of standards are designed to protect the government’s interests from 
potential harm posed by individuals or firms which present a lack of business 
honesty or integrity, or have a history of seriously poor performance.35 Precisely 
because the U.S. rules regarding exclusion and debarment regulation aim to 
reduce the government’s reputational and performance risks, the rules in effect 
encourage vendors to invest in themselves for future work with government. 
Contractors know that their future awards depend upon contracting officers 
31 https://www.acquisition.gov/content/part-9-contractor-qualifications.
32 As noted above, there is a separate rule for debarment regarding federal spending outside the pro-
curement process, such as grants, loans, and other forms of government assistance; that rule is 
known as the “Nonprocurement Common Rule” (NCR), which similarly provides for govern-
mentwide nonprocurement suspension and debarment. There is discussion in the federal procure-
ment community of consolidating the procurement and nonprocurement rules under a single, 
uniform rule regarding suspension and debarment, which would be applicable across the federal 
government. See, e.g., Robert Meunier & Trevor Nelson, supra note 5.
33 Definitions of terms used throughout the regulation are set forth at FAR 2.101.
34 See FAR 9.406-3.
35 The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee Report FY 2017, supra note 27, at 2; see FAR 
9.402(a).
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finding them responsible at the time of award, and that their businesses can 
collapse – debarment is often termed the “death penalty” for contractors – if a 
suspension and debarment official finds them not “presently responsible.” Beyond 
the impact in the federal procurement market, suspension or debarment may in 
effect mean that a firm cannot bid in state or local procurement markets, and “a 
sudden contraction of bank credit, adverse impact on the market price of listed 
shares, if any, and critical uneasiness of creditors generally, to say nothing of a 
‘loss of face’ in the business community”.36
Because exclusion and debarment are tools to reduce the U.S. government’s 
risks in contracting, a logical corollary is that exclusion and debarment are not 
meant to punish wayward contractors or individuals, for punishment bears only 
an indirect relationship to the government’s risk posture. The U.S. government 
leaves punishment and deterrence largely to civil and criminal measures, such as 
the severe penalties imposed for contractor fraud by the U.S. False Claims Act.37 
“The serious nature of debarment and suspension,” notes FAR 9.402, “requires 
that these sanctions be imposed only in the public interest for the Government’s 
protection and not for purposes of punishment”.38 
Debarment means disqualification from federal contracting for a specified 
period, typically three years for firms, but longer if there are serious circum-
stances.39 Although suspended or debarred contractors are excluded from receiv-
ing contracts, an agency head may for “compelling reason” override that ban. 
Contractors suspended or debarred also may not conduct business with the U.S. 
government as agents or representatives of other contractors.40 
What is more, a party precluded from participating in federal contracts is also 
excluded from receiving grants, loans, and other forms of federal assistance.41 
36 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 344 F.2d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
37 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, The False Claims Act: A Primer (2011), available at https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.
38 For background on the policy issues presented by U.S. debarment, see the collected essays by 
Professor Steven Schooner, U.S. Senator Susan Collins, Richard Bednar (former Army suspending 
and debarring official (SDO)), Steven Shaw (then the Air Force SDO), Danielle Brian (director of 
a watchdog group, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO)), James McCullough and John 
Pachter (senior practitioners), Professor Christopher Yukins, Jennifer Zucker (then a U.S. Army 
officer) and Abram Pafford, Suspension and Debarment: Emerging Issues in Law and Policy, Public 
Procurement Law Review, Vol. 13, 2004, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=509004. 
39 See, e.g., U.S. General Services Administration, Suspension and Debarment Division, Suspension 
and Debarment: Frequently Asked Questions, www.gsa.gov/about-us/organization/office-of-govern-
mentwide-policy/office-of-acquisition-policy/gsa-acq-policy-integrity-workforce/suspension-debar-
ment-division/suspension-debarment/frequently-asked-questions-suspension-debarment. 
40 FAR 9.405.
41 The U.S. Office of Management and Budget, in the White House, has issued guidelines to agencies 
on government-wide debarment and suspension in “nonprocurement” matters (such as grants), at 
2 C.F.R. Part 180. As noted, see supra note 34, there is a policy initiative underway to unify these 
two sets of rules, in “procurement” and “nonprocurement” matters.
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Suspensions and debarments apply governmentwide – one agency’s action pre-
cludes all executive agencies from doing business with the excluded party.42 Not-
withstanding the debarment, suspension, or proposed debarment of a contractor, 
agencies may continue contracts or subcontracts in existence at the time of the 
action unless the agency head directs otherwise.43 Suspension and debarment 
can be applied to both firms and individuals, and can be extended to a firm’s 
affiliates, as well.44 
Both actions – suspension and debarment – result in reputational harm to the 
affected individual or firm, through listing in the System for Award Management 
(www.sam.gov), a central repository of qualification and performance information 
operated by the U.S. General Services Administration. Listing at sam.gov is how 
those outside the government typically learn of suspensions and debarment. The 
information available in the sam.gov database is used by contracting agencies 
and prime contractors when evaluating prospective vendors and subcontractors, 
and by financial institutions and others outside the government – and outside 
the United States. 
With all this in mind, it should be highlighted that suspension and debarment 
are commonly seen as some of the last measures to be used by contracting agencies, 
and as measures that should be used sparingly.45 Before undertaking a suspension 
or debarment, an agency will often undertake other, less extreme measures, such 
as the administrative agreements discussed further below.46 Agencies in the U.S. 
government use suspension and debarment cautiously because they recognize that 
suspension and debarment can narrow competition dramatically, and can be eco-
nomically devastating to the affected contractor or individual. Because of that serious 
impact and the need to ensure due process, the affected individuals and firms can 
seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While that 
review is generally deferential – the judge will be looking for a reasonable basis 
in the record for the suspension or debarment decision – the prospects of that 
review and possible reversal do make suspension and debarment officials proceed 
cautiously. And those officials often proceed cautiously because they are keenly 
aware that suspension and debarment, as noted, can disrupt the supply chains on 
which agencies rely, and (by eliminating one or more prospective competitors) can 
42 See Christopher R. Yukins, Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 
233, 233-34 (2013); see also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Suspension and Debarment: 
Some Agency Programs Need Greater Attention, and Governmentwide Oversight Could Be Improved, 
GAO-11-739, at 4 (Aug 31, 2011). 
43 FAR 9.405-1; 2 C.F.R. § 180.415.
44 FAR 9.406-1.
45 For a very useful economic analysis of the costs and benefits of debarment, see Emmanuelle Auriol 
& Tina Soreide, An Economic Analysis of Debarment, 50 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 36 (2017).
46 See, e.g., Robert T. Rhoad & David Robbins, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension – Part II: Suspension 
and Debarment, 2019 Gov’t Contracts Year in Review Briefs 26 (Thomson Reuters 2019).
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radically reduce the competition available for a customer agency. A suspension and 
debarment official can approach the problem as one of balancing risk: while the 
government’s performance and reputational risks may weigh in favor of suspension 
or debarment, the contractor may be able to present assurances that it can mitigate 
those risks (through remedial compliance measures which parallel the “self-cleaning” 
contemplated by the EU procurement directives), and the risks of losing a compet-
itor and judicial reversal (for an unsupported action) may weigh in favor of other 
approaches, short of suspension or debarment, such as an administrative agreement. 
Because these risks and their resolution are inherently subjective and potentially 
quite serious for the government, a suspension and debarment official (especially 
in the larger customer agencies) is frequently a senior, respected official (and often 
an attorney) with substantial experience in procurement. Furthermore, because 
of the complicated nature of these proceedings, which may involve complex 
misconduct, an extended investigation and layers of remedial measures, these 
suspension and debarment officials (depending on the agency) may be supported 
by a dedicated staff of subordinate officials, themselves often with training in 
procurement and the law. The suspension and debarment officials can exercise 
enormous authority, and the function is treated quite seriously in the U.S. federal 
procurement community.
2.2 Grounds for Suspension and Debarment Under the FAR 
While the process for discretionary debarment leaves a great deal of authority to 
the suspension and debarment official, the system is not wholly discretionary, for 
(similar to the EU regime under Article 57 of the directive) there are mandatory 
grounds for debarment as well, typically based on violations of certain statutes.47 
Discretionary suspensions and debarments – our focus here – are framed by 
standards set forth in the FAR. Those standards, as noted, in many ways echo 
the standards for responsibility and indeed are found in sister provisions in FAR 
Part 9. Under those standards, 48 it is the debarring official’s responsibility to 
determine whether debarment is in the government’s interest49. The FAR says that 
agencies may – but need not of – suspend or debar a contractor when grounds 
for exclusion exist, such as fraud, tax evasion, corruption, or criminal behavior, 
a failure to disclose a serious violation (such as fraud or bribery), or on “any other 
cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility the 
47 See, e.g., Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. §§8301-8305); Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7401); Walsh-
Healey Public Contracts Act (41 U.S.C. § 6501-6511). 
48 By design, the grounds for discretionary suspension and debarment in the FAR are substantially 
similar. Compare FAR 9.406-2 (grounds for debarment) with FAR 9.407-2 (grounds for suspension). 
49 FAR 9.406-1. For a discussion of parallels between grounds for debarment under the FAR and the 
EU procurement directives, see Sati Harutyunyan, supra note 13, at 461.
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contractor.”50 This last ground, commonly referred to as the “catch-all” provision, 
affords the suspending and debarring enormous discretion, and renders the other 
grounds for suspension and debarment more illustrative than exclusive.
The suspension and debarment official’s discretion is redoubled because (as 
noted) he or she need not take action, if for example the contractor can remedy 
the apparent performance and reputational risks.51 In practice, that broad author-
ity not to take action, and the informal process for suspension and debarment 
(discussed below), mean that some suspension and debarment officials may exert 
quiet pressure on the contractor to undertake remedial measures in other quarters 
– a controversial practice52 that is likelier to emerge under a broader strategy for 
a “coordination of remedies” (as coordinated enforcement is known in the U.S. 
Department of Defense rules)53. The officials’ broad discretion and the relatively 
informal procedures discussed below also raise a risk of corruption, which helps 
explain the institutional practice (discussed above) of generally appointing senior 
officials to serve as suspension and debarment officials, the availability of judicial 
review grounded in the administrative record, and the procedural protections 
further outlined in the following section.
2.3 Procedural Aspects of U.S. Suspension and Debarment 
The informality of the discretionary U.S. federal suspension and debarment pro-
cess may be explained, in part, by its provenance: the process, which can exclude 
a contractor from all federal procurement, apparently evolved from a contracting 
officer’s largely informal responsibility determination to exclude a contractor 
from a particular procurement. In both cases the contractor is being disqualified 
because of perceived performance and reputational risks, and the government’s 
assessment of those highly variable risks – and the government’s assessment of 
whether it can tolerate those risks – lend themselves to a more informal process 
with relatively unstructured exchanges with the contractor.54
50 See Kate M. Manuel supra note 9, at. 11.
51 For a discussion of suspension and debarment as risk mitigation tools, see, e.g., Transparency Inter-
national UK, Suspension and Debarment: Strengthening Integrity in International Defence Contracting 
(2015), available at http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/150507-Suspension-and-De-
barment.pdf.
52 See, e.g., Andy Liu & W. Stanfield Johnson, Fraud, Debarment and Suspension – Part II: Suspension 
and Debarment, 2014 Gov’t Contract Year in Rev. Br. 21 (Thomson Reuters 2014) (discussing 
initiative to recover program funds).
53 See 32 C.F.R. Part 516, Appendix D, Department of Defense Directive 7050.5, Coordination of 
Remedies for Fraud and Corruption Related to Procurement Activities. 
54 See, e.g., Pascale Helen Dubois, Domestic and International Administrative Tools to Combat Fraud & 
Corruption: A Comparison of US Suspension and Debarment with the World Bank’s Sanctions System, 
U. Chi. L. For., Vol. 2012, Iss. 1, Art. 10, available at http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/
vol2012/iss1/10.
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The U.S. suspension and debarment process advances through stages intended 
to give the suspension and debarment official a sound understanding of the con-
tractor’s misconduct and remedial efforts. The suspension and debarment official 
may receive information on contractor misconduct from any number of sources, 
including investigators, prosecutors, competitors and the press. While different 
agencies have established very different suspension and debarment procedures 
(a point of some continuing controversy55), agencies as a general matter are to 
“establish procedures governing the debarment decisionmaking process that are 
as informal as is practicable, consistent with principles of fundamental fairness”56. 
Those procedures are to “afford the contractor (and any specifically named affili-
ates) an opportunity to submit, in person, in writing, or through a representative, 
information and argument in opposition to the proposed debarment”.57 
The provisions at FAR Subpart 9.4 describe the steps to be followed in those 
cases where suspension or debarment is not supported by the conclusive evidence 
of a criminal conviction or a civil judgment (civil fraud, for example). In those 
cases, the agency is give written notice of a proposed action to the contractor, 
with a statement of reasons, an explanation of the agency’s procedures, and an 
opportunity to respond. If the facts submitted by the contractor in opposition 
to the evidence of misconduct cited by the agency raise a “genuine dispute over 
facts material to the proposed debarment,” the agency is to afford “the contractor 
an opportunity to appear with counsel, submit documentary evidence, present 
witnesses, and confront any person the agency presents,” in a transcribed pro-
ceeding. The suspension and debarment official’s decision is to be in writing, 
based on the facts as found, together with any other information submitted by 
the contractor and in the administrative record. Another official may be tasked 
to make findings of fact, which the suspension and debarment official may reject 
“only after specifically determining them to be arbitrary and capricious or wholly 
erroneous.” Suspension or debarment ultimately must be based upon a prepon-
derance of the evidence, with findings and the effects of the action described in 
a written notice to the contractor.
While the FAR provisions describing the process are not terribly precise or 
prescriptive (which explains the significant variance in agency procedures), the 
FAR does carefully frame the heart of the process – the decision to suspend or 
debar. The factors set forth in the FAR confirm that this is indeed a risk-based 
decision by the agency, which must carefully weigh the remedial measures the 
contractor has taken that mitigate the performance and reputational risks that 
55 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Section of Public Contract Law, Anatomy of a Debarment 
Action, at 37-38 (Annual Meeting, Aug. 2, 2018, Chicago, IL), available at https://www.cov.com/-/
media/files/corporate/publications/2018/08/suspension_and_debarment_update.pdf. 
56 FAR 9.406-3(b)(1).
57 Id.
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the contractor’s misconduct raises for the government. Before arriving at any 
suspension or debarment decision, the SDO should consider factors such as the 
following:58
• Whether the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal control 
systems in place at the time of the activity which constitutes cause for debarment, or 
had adopted such procedures prior to any government investigation of the activity 
cited as a cause for debarment. This factor clearly assumes that contractors will 
have internal controls – corporate compliance systems – in place before any 
misconduct occurs, as called for by FAR 52.203-13.
• Whether the contractor brought the activity cited as a cause for debarment to the 
attention of the appropriate government agency in a timely manner. This factor 
relates directly to contractors’ obligation, under a “mandatory disclosure” rule, 
to report (to the contracting officer and the agency’s inspector general) if the 
contractor discovers “credible evidence” of civil or criminal fraud, bribery or 
gratuities, or significant overpayments by the government. This “mandatory 
disclosure” obligation stems from the corporate compliance system required 
by the same clause, FAR 52.203-13; if a contractor has an effective compli-
ance system in place (goes the reasoning), misconduct will be brought to the 
attention of corporate principals who should, in turn, report the most serious 
matters to the government.
• Whether the contractor has fully investigated the circumstances surrounding the 
cause for debarment and, if so, made the result of the investigation available to 
the debarring official. This factor links back to a separate obligation under FAR 
52.203-13 – an assumption that the contractor will undertake an internal inves-
tigation in cases where there are allegations of fraud or criminal misconduct, 
and if the contractor finds “credible evidence” of covered conduct (e.g., fraud or 
bribery), the contractor will make a mandatory disclosure to the government. 
The regulators made it clear that the legal privileges that normally cover an 
internal investigation of this type will be respected,59 and that disclosure can 
be deferred to allow a reasonable time for the internal investigation60.
• Whether the contractor cooperated fully with Government agencies during the 
investigation and any court or administrative action. This factor can be read 
against the backdrop of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guide-
lines, which were an early foundation for corporate compliance standards now 
adopted worldwide, and ultimately for the contractor compliance requirements 
58 See, e.g., FAR 9.406-1 (factors that should be considered for debarment).
59 73 Fed. Reg. 67064, 67077 (Nov. 12, 2008).
60 73 Fed. Reg. at 67073 (“credible evidence” standard implies “that the contractor will have the 
opportunity to take some time for preliminary examination of the evidence to determine its cred-
ibility before deciding to disclose to the Government”).
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under FAR 52.203-13.61 The Sentencing Guidelines say that criminal sentences 
for private firms can be reduced if they cooperate with government investiga-
tions, as part of a normal system of corporate controls.62 
• Whether the contractor has paid or has agreed to pay all criminal, civil, and 
administrative liability for the improper activity, including any investigative or 
administrative costs incurred by the Government, and has made or agreed to make 
full restitution. This factor, which calls for payment and restitution, reflects 
the “coordination of remedies” discussed above – a coordinated enforcement 
effort, to ensure that the government is compensated for its losses.63 Notably 
this factor does not explicitly call for victim compensation. In contrast, Article 
57 of the EU’s procurement directive does require that a contractor, excluded 
because of serious misconduct, has “paid or undertaken to pay compensation 
in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct,” before 
that contractors will be readmitted to the EU public procurement markets.64
• Whether the contractor has taken appropriate disciplinary action against the 
individuals responsible for the activity which constitutes cause for debarment. 
This factor shows that these factors are, in many ways, simply a restatement 
61 See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: U.S. Contractor Compliance Rules Likely to 
Expand, 50 Gov. Cont. ¶ 147 (Apr. 23, 2008) (discussing evolution of corporate compliance rules), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1125068. 
62 See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 2018, Ch. 8 – Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, at 1 (2018) (“The two factors that mitigate the ultimate punishment of an organization 
are: (i) the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and (ii) self-reporting, coop-
eration, or acceptance of responsibility.”), available at https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2018-guide-
lines-manual/2018-chapter-8#NaN. 
63 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
64 Paragraph 6 of Article 57, Directive 2014/24/EU, spells out the remedial measures that excluded 
contractors must undertake before they can be readmitted to the covered public procurement markets: 
Any economic operator that is in one of the situations referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 may provide 
evidence to the effect that measures taken by the economic operator are sufficient to demonstrate its 
reliability despite the existence of a relevant ground for exclusion. If such evidence is considered as 
sufficient, the economic operator concerned shall not be excluded from the procurement procedure.  
For this purpose, the economic operator shall prove that it has paid or undertaken to pay 
compensation in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct, 
clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively collaborat-
ing with the investigating authorities and taken concrete technical, organisational and per-
sonnel measures that are appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct.  
The measures taken by the economic operators shall be evaluated taking into account the gravity and 
particular circumstances of the criminal offence or misconduct. Where the measures are considered 
to be insufficient, the economic operator shall receive a statement of the reasons for that decision.  
An economic operator which has been excluded by final judgment from participating in pro-
curement or concession award procedures shall not be entitled to make use of the possibility 
provided for under this paragraph during the period of exclusion resulting from that judgment 
in the Member States where the judgment is effective.
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of compliance system requirements from around the world, for rules govern-
ing compliance systems – which are largely identical worldwide -- regularly 
require precisely this type of disciplinary action.65 Indeed, Article 57 of 
Directive 2014/24/EU similarly calls for “concrete . . . personnel measures 
that are appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct,” as 
part of the “self-cleaning” demanded of contractors that seek to rejoin public 
procurement markets.66
• Whether the contractor has implemented or agreed to implement remedial meas-
ures, including any identified by the Government. As with Article 57 of Directive 
2014/24/EU, discussed above, this factor looks to the contractor’s efforts to 
“self-clean” (to use the EU term) by implementing stronger remedial measures. 
This factor should be read in conjunction with the first factor, above: under the 
U.S. system, the contractor’s remedial measures will not be new, but instead 
will likely build on (and improve upon) a prior system of controls, based upon 
any lessons learned from the misconduct of the contractor’s agents. The factor 
also reflects a practical reality in U.S. debarment actions: they often follow on a 
protracted period of investigation and review by other enforcement authorities, 
an extended process of iterative exchanges between government officials and 
the contractor, during which the government officials will often provide very 
direct advice on remedial measures the contractor should undertake.
• Whether the contractor has instituted or agreed to institute new or revised review 
and control procedures and ethics training programs. This factor follows on the 
prior one, and looks to core elements of a normal corporate compliance pro-
gram: effective procedures and training.67 
• Whether the contractor has had adequate time to eliminate the circumstances 
within the contractor’s organization that led to the cause for debarment. While 
this factor appears to favor the contractor, in fact it may be used by a suspension 
and debarment official to extend a review, if it appears the contractor has not 
been quick or aggressive enough in “eliminating the circumstances” – e.g., 
replacing personnel or revamping control systems – that helped cause the prior 
misconduct. The factor reflects the highly engaged back-and-forth that can 
occur between the contractor and the suspension and debarment official, an 
important distinguishing aspect of the U.S. system.
65 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, FCPA Guidance, 
at 56 & n. 309 (2016) (describing parallel compliance system requirements in legal regimes world-
wide), available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/
guide.pdf. 
66 See supra note 61. 
67 See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, U.S. Justice Department Issues New Corporate Compliance Guidance 
(May 1, 2019) (linking to parallel compliance requirements in United States and internationally), 
http://publicprocurementinternational.com/2019/05/01/u-s-justice-department-issues-new-corpo-
rate-compliance-guidance/. 
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• Whether the contractor’s management recognizes and understands the seriousness 
of the misconduct giving rise to the cause for debarment and has implemented 
programs to prevent recurrence. In very practical terms, this is often the most 
important part of the suspension and debarment process in the U.S. system: the 
contractor’s senior management must convince the suspension and debarment 
official that management understands the firm’s errors, and will remedy them 
going forward. (Because an individual facing debarment can point to no formal 
“compliance system” – the focus of the prior mitigating factors – to steer his 
or her behavior, this may be the only factor that an individual can reasonably 
rely on in arguing against his or her debarment.68)  
These factors set forth in the FAR are only illustrative, but they confirm impor-
tant aspects of the U.S. suspension and debarment system. The factors confirm 
that the U.S. system is not designed for punishment; nowhere do the factors ask 
about how rank or immoral the contractor’s misconduct was, or whether that 
conduct merits proportionate punishment. Instead, the factors (and the U.S. 
rules in general) treat misconduct as a risk, and they assume that the contractor 
– typically an established actor in a mature procurement system – can be relied 
upon to mitigate that risk by making internal adjustments to its control systems 
and organization. The factors also open the door to other forms of risk mitigation, 
short of suspension or debarment.
Probably the most prominent alternative to suspension or debarment is an 
administrative agreement. Under these agreements, a contractor and the govern-
ment will agree to specific remedial measures that the contractor must undertake, 
and the administrative agreement will be posted by the government online.69 As 
noted, the FAR specifically contemplates that a contractor found to have engaged 
in misconduct may nevertheless conclude an administrative agreement under 
which the company will implement new control measures, in return for being 
allowed to remain a federal contractor.70 Because an administrative agreement 
leaves the government at a severe informational disadvantage – it cannot afford to 
monitor the contractor on a regular, ongoing basis – the government may insist 
68 See generally Kara Sacilotto, One Is the Loneliest Number: A Case for Changing Suspension and Debar-
ment Regulations to Better Address Potential Exclusion of Individual Suspension and Debarment, 47 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 479 (2018), available at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_contract_law/
publications/public_contract_law_jrnl/v47-n4/suspension/; Daniel E. Schoeni, Personal Debarment 
for Non-Distributive Corporate Misconduct: On the Efficacy of Debarring the Individual from Govern-
ment Contracts for Collective Wrongdoing, 46 Pub. Cont. L.J. 51 (2016).
69 See generally Jessica G. Willard, Balancing Goals: FAPIIS’s Effect on Administrative Agreements, 43 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 105, 118-19 (2013).
70 FAR 9.406-3(e)(1) (“If the contractor enters into an administrative agreement with the Government 
in order to resolve a debarment proceeding, the debarring official shall access the website (available 
at https://www.cpars.gov, then select FAPIIS) and enter the requested information.”).
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that a corporate monitor be part of the administrative agreement. Although cor-
porate monitors are controversial (in no small part because they are expensive),71 
standards have been developed72 to help ensure monitors’ professionalism and 
objectivity, and monitors remain an important part of resolving suspension and 
debarment actions in the U.S. government73.
3 Comparative Lessons from the U.S. Suspension and 
Debarment System 
As was noted above, future transatlantic cooperation in public procurement will 
turn in part on a shared understanding of both the U.S. and EU procurement 
laws. Coordinating these legal regimes, which play such an important part in 
shaping their markets, will make it easier for vendors to provide essential com-
petition on both sides of the Atlantic. That coordination is especially important 
with regard to exclusion and debarment, because the issue at the heart of those 
doctrines – contractor qualification – can raise insurmountable barriers to trade 
if mishandled. Conversely, because governments around the world face similar 
types of reputational and performance risks, being able to share information on 
contractor qualification – between loosely similar systems will make it easier 
for governments on both sides of the Atlantic to control the performance and 
reputational risks presented by wayward contractors. 
The good news is that the grounds for contractor qualification (and conversely, 
exclusion) in the U.S. and EU systems are generally very similar, as the discussion 
above reflected. The challenge comes in the mechanics: as the discussion above also 
showed, as an operational matter the two systems sometimes approach contractor 
qualification and exclusion in starkly different ways. Fortunately, those differences 
arise in part because the EU system is still filling in gaps (questions of which 
official should handle exclusion, for example) which the U.S. system resolved 
some time ago. By sharing lessons learned from the U.S. experience, it may be 
possible to draw the two legal regimes onto parallel paths, to the benefit of both. 
To that end, the discussion below reviews three key issues in suspension and 
debarment, problems for which EU Member States may find solutions in lessons 
71 The Trump administration has cautioned Justice Department prosecutors that corporate monitors 
should be used selectively, not presumptively, in resolving criminal cases. See Memorandum from 
U.S. Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski, Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division 
Matters (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1100366/download. 
72 See American Bar Association, Monitors Standards, available at https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/criminal_justice/standards/MonitorsStandards/. 
73 See generally John S. Pachter, Independent Monitors: What They Do and How to Avoid the Need for 
Them, The Clause, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, at 17 (Board of Contract Appeals Bar Association, June 2014), 
available at https://bcaba.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/BCABA_The-Clause_Mar-2014.pdf.
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learned in the United States. (It appears that each of these lessons could be adopted 
without violating the broad framework for procurement regulation laid out by 
the EU procurement directives.) First, in keeping with a broad anti-corruption 
trend inside and outside the EU, EU Member States may wish to require that 
all contractors establish corporate controls, not only to “self-clean” when some-
thing goes wrong, but from inception, as an integral part of their qualifications 
as contractors. Second, following models from the United States (and Germany 
and Hungary), EU Member States may wish to use the flexibility explicitly left 
them by the EU procurement directives and “centralize” the debarment function 
in senior officials. Third, Member States may wish to consider the use of admin-
istrative agreements as a means of resolving exclusion issues; it seems that this 
would not contradict the EU procurement directives, but instead would allow 
for formalization of the “self-cleaning” contemplated by the EU procurement 
directives. Each of these options is considered below. 
3.1 Requiring Contractors to Establish Controls 
As was discussed above, while U.S. federal procurement rules require all cov-
ered contractors to have internal controls in place shortly after the inception of 
a covered contract,74 the EU procurement directives calls for such controls – for 
“self-cleaning” – only after certain corporate misconduct has occurred.75 Under 
Article 57 of the Directive 2014/24/EU, when a contractor has been found to 
have engaged in certain serious classes of misconduct, such as participation in 
a criminal organization or corruption, the contractor is to be barred from EU 
public procurement competitions unless it engages in “self-cleaning.” Article 57 
of Directive 2014/24/EU defines that self-cleaning to mean “measures that are 
appropriate to prevent further criminal offenses or misconduct,” and describes 
precisely the very same sorts of corporate controls (such as technical, organi-
zational and personnel measures) that would normally be required under the 
U.S. procurement rules. (In fact, these are precisely the same sorts of corporate 
74 The federal contract clause which requires a corporate compliance system, FAR 52.203-13, is trig-
gered when the contract is expected to exceed $5.5 million in value and the performance period is 
expected to exceed 120 days, per the provision at FAR 3.1004. A contractor covered by the clause 
must develop a corporate code of conduct (within 30 days), and establish a business ethics awareness 
and compliance program and internal control system (within 90 days). FAR 52.203-13(b)-(c).
75 See paragraph 6 of Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU, quoted supra note 66; see also Hermann 
Pünder, Hans-Joachim Prieß & Sue Arrowsmith, Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (Carl 
Heymanns Verlag, Köln 2009); Sarah Schoenmaekers, Self-Cleaning and Leniency: Comparable 
Objectives but Different Levels of Success?,13 EPPPL Rev. 3 (2018).
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controls that would be required under many nations’ laws, as corporate compli-
ance requirements are largely the same the world over.76) 
Thus, although both the EU and the U.S. regimes call for corporate controls 
to address contractor misconduct, the EU procurement directives calls for them 
only after misconduct emerges, which is in sharp contrast with the U.S. approach 
and with general requirements under Member State law. The United Kingdom’s 
Bribery Act, for example, assumes that all firms will have controls in place – not 
only those that engage in misconduct -- for the Act makes such controls the only 
available affirmative defense if an agent of a firm engages in bribery.77 French 
law (the “Sapin II” law) similarly calls for all large French firms to put corporate 
controls in place.78 Moreover, a growing number of nations worldwide now require 
contractors to have compliance systems as place, as part of a broader trend toward 
requiring corporate compliance systems.79 
The EU procurement directives thus appears to stand apart from an emerging 
international trend because it requires “self-cleaning” (corporate compliance) 
measures only from those firms that have actually engaged in misconduct. The EU 
procurement directives narrower approach may have resulted from an idiosyncratic 
policy goal that the EU procurement directives seeks to address: the need to foster 
adequate competition across the EU by re-admitting those contractors, otherwise 
excluded, that engage in self-cleaning.80 That goal, grounded in competition policy 
and EU integration, is divorced from the anti-corruption goals which normally 
inform governments’ requirements that private firms establish internal controls. 
The U.S. experience, and the experience of other nations inside and outside the 
EU, suggest that EU Member States may wish to take a broader approach and call 
for contractor controls from all firms, as part of an integrated effort at controlling 
risk in the procurement process. Notably, the EU procurement directives appears 
to leave that possibility open, for Recital 102 of Directive 2014/24/EU provides 
“for the possibility that economic operators can adopt compliance measures aimed 
at . . . preventing further occurrences of . . . misbehavior,” including “personnel 
76 See U.S. Department of Justice & U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, FCPA Guidance, supra 
note 62, at 56 & n. 309.
77 Bribery Act 2010, ch. 23, § 7, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/section/7; 
Nick Kochan, The UK Bribery Act – Britain’s New Legal Landscape, Crim. Just., Fall 2013, at 46.
78 See, e.g., Stephane Bonifassi, The New “Sapin II” French Anti-Corruption Law, 33 Int’l Enforcemt. 
L. Rep. 21 (2017). 
79 See Claire Martin, Integrity Pacts and Corporate Compliance Programmes: Contrary or Complemen-
tary?, 14 EPPPL Rev. 16, 17 & Table 1 (2017) (reviewing nations’ requirements).
80 See, e.g., Roman Majtan, The Self-Cleaning Dilemma: Reconciling Competing Objectives of Procure-
ment Processes, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 291, 346 (2013) (“The proponents of the self-clean-
ing theory argue that every firm or individual has a right to apply for public contracts based on the 
principle of free movement and that requiring suspension or debarment would not be proportionate 
because it would go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the procurement process 
under the principle of equal treatment.”).
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and organisational measures such as the . . . the implementation of reporting and 
control systems, the creation of an internal audit structure to monitor compliance 
and the adoption of internal liability and compensation rules.” The Court of Jus-
tice for the EU has cautioned that qualification requirements that overly narrow 
competition may violate EU procurement requirements.81 But a requirement 
such as the U.S. requirement – a requirement that a compliance system be put 
in place only after award – would seem less likely a cause of concern, especially 
since some Member States are now effectively requiring that all corporations (or 
at least all large corporations) have such compliance systems in place, and the 
same Recital 102 of Directive 2014/14/EU says that, with regard to self-clean-
ing, “it should be left to Member States to determine the exact procedural and 
substantive conditions applicable in such cases”.
3.2 Establishing a Centralized Exclusion Function 
Another important aspect of suspension and debarment in the U.S. government, 
as noted, is its reliance on a senior official in an agency – a suspension and 
debarment official -- who is responsible for assessing contractors for suspension 
or debarment. (Notably, the World Bank has also made a central suspension and 
debarment officer part of its sanctions system.82) 
The EU procurement directives, in contrast, calls for the exclusion decision to 
be made by individual contracting authorities and entities on a contract-by-con-
tract basis. Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU provides that it is the contracting 
authority that shall exclude an economic operator from participation in a procure-
ment procedure. This may raise serious issues in practice, for contracting entities 
– specifically, the contracting officials making decisions for those authorities – 
may lack the experience and knowledge necessary to assess the reputational and 
performance risks posed by a wayward contractor. 
 The U.S. approach suggests that exclusion and debarment decisions are com-
plex and require a specially authorized, senior official. In the U.S. federal pro-
curement system, the suspension and debarment official (SDO) serves a broader 
public interest in assessing contractors for their present responsibility. The SDO 
must have a keen understanding of the legal regulation concerning government 
acquisition, and also must be able to discern the future reputational and per-
formance risks that a vendor may pose. The SDO must be able to assess the 
81 See, e.g., SIGMA Programme, OECD, Implementing the EU Directives on the selection of economic 
operators in public procurement procedures, at 181-187 (SIGMA Paper No. 56, 2018) (reviewing 
Court of Justice decisions), available at http://www.sigmaweb.org/publications/Selection-of-eco-
nomic-operators-in-public-procurement-procedures-SIGMA-Paper-56-September-2018.pdf. 
82 See generally Christopher R. Yukins, Rethinking the World Bank’s Sanctions System, 55 Gov. Contrac-
tor 1 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2357691. 
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seriousness of the contractor’s acts or omissions, in terms of both performance and 
reputational risks to the government, and must be able to assess the contractor’s 
remedial measures and other factors, such as the economic impact of barring 
the contractor from future awards. The SDO’s authority extends to all phases 
of a suspension and debarment procedure, including the gathering of evidence, 
the exchanges with the affected contractor, the application of the decision, and 
a possible administrative agreement.83 
The EU procurement directives leaves open the possibility that Member States 
will appoint a higher level official, analogous to an SDO, to oversee exclusion 
and debarment. Recital 102 of Directive 2014/24/EU states that Member States 
should, in particular, “be free to decide whether to allow the individual contracting 
authorities to carry out the relevant assessments or to entrust other authorities on 
a central or decentralised level with that task”. 
In a 2018 study, the SIGMA Programme at the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) concluded, based upon a survey of best 
practices across Europe, that a centralized approach was a sounder one. The 
SIGMA report noted that, because (per the recital quoted above), in “implement-
ing requirements on self-cleaning measures, Member States have the discretion to 
determine the exact procedural and substantive conditions that will be applicable,” 
EU Member States “are free to decide whether to allow the individual contracting 
authority to carry out the relevant assessment or to entrust another authority, on a 
central level (see the example of Hungary . . . ) or a decentralised level, with this 
task.”84 Citing specifically to Hungary’s experience with a centralized function, 
the SIGMA Programme reported:
The 2014 Directive introduced “self-cleaning” measures. Despite the existence 
of one or more relevant grounds for exclusion, self-cleaning measures allow 
economic operators to rehabilitate themselves on the basis of strict conditions 
and take part in procurement procedures. An interesting way of transposing 
this new mechanism has been chosen by Hungary, which opted for centralised 
management of self-cleaning decisions. A decision-making process that is carried 
out centrally enables the uniform application throughout the national procurement 
83 FAR 9.406-1(a). 
84 SIGMA Programme, supra note 79, at 50. 
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system, ensures legal protection and a higher level of legal certainty compared to 
decision making at the level of an individual contracting authority.85
While the Hungarian approach is not, strictly speaking, precisely like the U.S. 
approach – the U.S. system consolidates control of system-wide exclusion in 
a senior debarring official, while the Hungarian approach centralizes only the 
approval of self-cleaning measures which will allow excluded contractors to com-
pete again – the practical effect is largely the same: the Hungarian system, like 
the U.S. system, centralizes responsibility for admitting or excluding vendors 
from a broader procurement system, at a higher administrative level than the 
procuring entity. 
Germany has also adopted a centralized approach to exclusion, similar to 
Hungary’s. Under recently developed German rules, the German Competition 
Authority (Bundeskartellamt) has the power to rule on whether firms excluded 
for improper behavior have undertaken sufficient “self-cleaning”; if so, the Bun-
deskartellamt will enter the firms’ names in a list of approved vendors.86 
Drawing on the Hungarian, German and U.S. experiences, EU Member States 
may wish to vest a higher, centralized authority with the power to exclude. These 
first steps to implement Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU under Hungarian 
85 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). The SIGMA report explained the reasoning behind a centralized 
approach, at pages 52-53:
In Hungary. . . the model introduced on 1 November 2015 by the new [Hungarian law] does 
not give freedom to contracting authorities, but instead delegates the decision on self-clean-
ing to the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) in a centralised manner. The legal practice 
of self-cleaning is evolving gradually. In the interest of legal certainty, the decision was made 
to transfer, through the [law], the powers related to self-cleaning to the PPA. Thus the [law] 
does not entrust contracting authorities with decision making related to the evaluation of the 
reliability of the economic operator concerned. The PPA or the court, in the event of a judicial 
review, may declare that the measures taken by the economic operator meet the conditions pre-
scribed by law and accordingly serve as verification of the economic operator’s reliability. If the 
economic operator has been self-cleaned, it cannot be excluded from a procurement procedure 
in the future, even if grounds for exclusion exist. The contracting authority has no opportunity 
of expressing a different viewpoint, since it must accept the decision of the PPA.
86 The German approach was summarized as follows by Pascal Friton &Christopher Wolters:
In summer 2017, the way was paved for the Register centralising existing registers at [a] national 
level. It follows the approach of the US debarment system and the Financial Regulation and 
enables contracting authorities to decide on exclusions more efficiently and with a higher 
degree of legal certainty. However, going beyond the Financial Regulation as well as the US 
debarment system, it also enables companies to have self-cleaning measures assessed by a cen-
tral authority, which is binding for all German contracting authorities. The Register’s aim is 
thus, on the one hand, to fight and prevent white-collar crimes and, on the other, to protect 
fair competition in public procurement. The RCA obliges the German Federal Cartel Office 
(FCO), as the responsible administrative office, to implement the Register by the end of 2020. 
Pascal Friton & Christopher Wolters, The German Register of Competition and Its International 
Context, 13 EPPPL 119, 125 (2018).
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and German law suggest that other Member States may want to assess whether, 
following the U.S. model, they wish to vest a senior official – perhaps, per the 
U.S. model, a senior official with intimate knowledge of the competitive landscape 
and the procurement and reputational risks the government faces – to guide the 
exclusion process.
3.3 Administrative Agreements and Independent Monitors 
Another important tool in the U.S. suspension and debarment system is the admin-
istrative agreement; as noted, a U.S. debarring official may decide not to suspend 
or debar a contractor, but instead to enter into an administrative agreement which 
specifies the remedial measures the contractor commits to undertake.87 The FAR 
allows for the use of administrative agreements in lieu of suspension or debar-
ment, and requires the debarring official to publish any such agreement on the 
Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS).88 The 
Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee reported, for example, that 
fourteen agencies entered into a total of 64 administrative agreements in 2017.89 
As a practical matter in the U.S. system, if grounds for suspension or debar-
ment have been established but the debarring official has been assured that the 
entity is nonetheless presently responsible, the suspension or proposed debarment 
process may be settled with an administrative agreement.90 These agreements are 
viewed as “appropriate when government officials determine that the company 
has made a sufficient showing of corporate responsibility and cooperation, and 
that the government’s interests can be adequately safeguarded by allowing the 
company to continue to do business with the government, subject to certain 
conditions, including supervision and appropriate reporting.”91 Administrative 
agreements allow the contractor, the government and affected stakeholders – 
including employees, pensioners, shareholders and members of the public – to 
avoid the potentially severe disruption of a suspension or debarment.92
Administrative agreements can vary from one matter to another, but in general 
they allow contractors to reduce, suspend or avoid outright government enforce-
ment actions, including suspension or debarment.93 Among other things, an 
87 These agreements are different from administrative contracts, which are recognized in some EU 
Member States including France and Spain. 
88 The Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) is a database that 
contains information to support award decisions as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR).
89 See The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee Report FY 2017, supra 27.
90 See Joseph D. West, Timothy J. Hatch & Christyne K. Brennan, supra note 32, at 9. 
91 See John Pachter, supra note 75, at 18.
92 Id.
93 See Kate M. Manuel, supra note 9, at 1. 
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administrative agreement can help sustain future competition, when a debarment 
could cripple competition by eliminating a key competitor.94 
In an administrative agreement, the contractor will typically admit its wrongful 
conduct, and may agree to pay damages or restitution, to fire or reassign employ-
ees, to implement more rigorous compliance measures or to allow increased 
auditing, or to undertake other remedial measures.95 Administrative agreements 
can be concluded with both firms and individuals.96
Concluding an administrative agreement sometimes requires the appoint-
ment of an independent monitor. As an independent third party, relied upon as 
the impartial “eyes and ears” of the government, the monitor should not be an 
employee of the contractor or the government. If a monitor is appointed, the con-
tractor can work collaboratively with the monitor to strengthen and improve the 
company’s ethics and internal controls, and the monitor should have access to all 
records and individuals. A monitor typically will assess the company’s conform-
ance with the terms of the administrative agreement, including the effectiveness 
of the company’s compliance program, and will then make recommendations 
for improvement in a report to the agency.97
Although the EU procurement directives makes no direct references to admin-
istrative agreements or monitoring, Recital 102 of Directive 2014/24/EU, as noted, 
does explicitly leave it to the Member States to determine how contractors should 
undertake “self-cleaning”98 – precisely, it seems, the issues that would fall within 
an administrative agreement and a monitoring arrangement. 
Nor does Directive 2014/24/EU bar these practices, and Transparency Inter-
national has long supported these types of cooperative efforts between contractors 
and government agencies through “Integrity Pacts,” which have been used across 
94 See The Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee Report FY 2017, supra note 27, at 4. 
95 See Kate M. Manuel supra note 9, at 12.
96 For a discussion of administrative agreements entered into with individuals who otherwise faced 
suspension or debarment, see Warren Bianchi, Equality in Exclusion: Empowering Individuals in the 
Suspension and Debarment System, 45 Pub. Cont. L.J. 79, 90 (2015).
97 See John Pachter, supra note 75. 
98 Recital 102 states, in relevant part:
Allowance should, however, be made for the possibility that economic operators can adopt 
compliance measures aimed at remedying the consequences of any criminal offences or mis-
conduct and at effectively preventing further occurrences of the misbehaviour. Those measures 
might consist . . . of personnel and organisational measures such as . . . the implementation of 
reporting and control systems . . . . Economic operators should have the possibility to request 
that compliance measures taken with a view to possible admission to the procurement procedure 
be examined. However, it should be left to Member States to determine the exact procedural 
and substantive conditions applicable in such cases.
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the Continent.99 Member States, drawing on this history and the U.S. experience, 
and relying on the flexibility left by the EU procurement directives, may decide to 
call for the use of administrative agreements and monitoring to control residual 
performance and reputational risks among contractors that previously engaged 
in wrongdoing, but seek to reenter public procurement markets.
4 Conclusion
As the foregoing shows, future transatlantic coordination in procurement markets 
will require a close understanding of the legal regimes on both continents. One 
especially important area of coordination will involve contractor qualification, 
both because of the potential barriers to trade and because of governments’ com-
mon need to share information. The main challenge in contractor qualification 
– and exclusion – is to balance, on one hand, the need to contain the reputational 
and performance risks that bad contractors may pose, against on the other the 
deep disruption that barring a contractor may cause. To effect that balance, the 
EU Member States implementing the recent EU procurement directives may 
wish to look to U.S. strategies for exclusion and debarment, strategies which are 
deeply grounded in a risk-based approach. 
The three strategies discussed in this paper – a broader reliance on corporate 
compliance among contractors, centralizing authority over the exclusion of con-
tractors, and the use of administrative agreements and independent monitors as an 
alternative to debarment – have been used reliably in the United States, and seem 
to fit comfortably within the broad mandates of the EU procurement directives. 
Two of the strategies – corporate controls and centralized authority over exclusions 
– are already widely used in EU Member States, and administrative agreements 
and independent monitors are logical extensions of the “corporate self-cleaning” 
that the directives contemplate for sloppy or corrupt contractors. Adopting these 
strategies would seem to follow the trajectory plotted by the directives, and would 
help draw both systems, U.S. and EU, toward a common path. 
99 See for example M. H. Wiehen, Der Flughafen Berlin-Brandenburg in Schönefeld und der Transpar-
ency International Integritätspakt, Transparency International Deutschland (Berlin, 2013); Dirk 
Westphal, Der Flughafen BER Ist Eine Saubere Bau, Berliner Morgenpost, Mar. 5, 2012, https://
www.morgenpost.de/flughafen-BER/article106042074/Der-Flughafen-BER-ist-eine-saubere-Baus-
telle.html. For a discussion of how Integrity Pacts sponsored by Transparency International can be 
integrated into modern compliance systems, see Claire Martin, supra note 78.
